Naomi Klein against Apocalypticism? Part I

I have begun reading "The Shock Doctrine" by Naomi Klein. As part of my reflection of Graham Ward's notions of the Body politic, particularly in "The Politics of Discipleship" and his reflection on constitutional monarchy, Francis Fukuyama's misguided liberal-democratic interpretation of Hegel and the necessity of some sort of monarchy I have often, in jest, suggested that the Lewis', the Canadian political family should be the Royal family replacing the current British one.

Naomi Klein, who's husband is Avi Lewis the son of Stephen Lewis, writes the following at the end of her introductory chapter:

"This desire for godlike powers of total creation is precisely why free-market ideologues are so drawn to crises and disasters. Non-apocalyptic reality is simply not hospitable to their ambitions.. Believers in the shock doctrine are convinced that only a great rupture - a flood, a war, a terrorist attack - can generate the kind of vast, clean canvases they crave. It is in these malleable moments..that these artists of the real plunge in their hands and begin their work of remaking the world." (page 24)

These concluding remarks finish her discursive activity in the introduction; with frequent reference to neoliberal economists and policy-makers as 'fundamentalists', a quotation from Milton Friedman when he describes himself as "an old-fashioned preacher delivering a Sunday sermon", a quotation from a Republican congressman from Lousianna where in passing reference suggests that the events of Hurricane Katrina somehow was God-ordained in order to reform the education system in favour of the free-market and of course the quotation from Genesis 9 (the narrative of the global deluge) that begins the chapter. Even the title of the book suggests some sort of religious reference.

Klein, again "Rooted in Biblical fantasies of great floods and great fires, it is a logic that leads ineluctably towards violence." (pg 23)

In her introduction Klein distances her position from a kind of 'unattainable purity' position of 'dangerous ideologies', such as but not exclusive to neoliberalism and the Chicago school of economics. She gives a brief glimpse into her own political location, favouring among other things the disbelief that Markets are inherently violent (because she suggests that it is possible to have a market economy demands 'no such ideological purity') and supporting a somewhat Keynesian position of a mixed market, quasi-socialist state.

I would like the file a grievance of some-sort, but I will do it by telling a story that Klein narrates at the beginning of her introduction. Speaking about how these "Shock" capitalists were using the tragedy of Katrina in New Orleans one of the characters in Klein's story asks "Are they blind?". As in blind to the immense suffering of the impoverished citizens of New Orleans who have lost so much because of poor planning and terrible natural events.

"'A mother with two kids chimed in. 'No they're not blind, they're evil. They see just fine.' " (page 4)

That mother had the courage to label what it was that these people were doing. Evil. Now although I appreciate Klein's insistence that this ideology leads to violence I feel that universalizing the tendency that all notions of 'purity', essentialism or the absolute leads to violence is false. Not neccesarily more dangerous, although perhaps it is, but false.

With her journalistic efforts and crusades I am sure Klein would find herself agreeing that we have to be rational and not ideologues in our search for justice. But may I continue by adding in the words of Alasdair Macintyre "Whose Justice? Which Rationality?"

With her support of diversity and her suggestion that perhaps some sort of 'free' market could exist she seeks co-existence with other communities with different belief systems. In evoking the communitarian discourse of Macintyre I am really asking if this contempt of things that are "contemptuos of pluralism" (page 23) really understands the meaning of difference, especially of different communties.

To take another angle her suggestion that 'purity' of ideology, belief or vision leads to violence seems to suggest she holds on to an 'ontology of violence' (Milbank). Such an ontology, as Milbank points out in "Theology and Social Theory", a book greatly influenced by Macintyre,is at the heart of classical liberalism, pragmatism, a little bit in Hegel and Marx, and certainly nihilism.

Now I believe co-existence is neccesary but "What existence? Which communities?" (Macintyre again), for the co-existence of Reformed and Anabaptist church in the Netherlands had very different views of what co-existence looks like, as the mainline Church-state relationship though in their refusal to be part of the state church as so non-conformist as to be dangerous to the state. Certain Islamic groups would have a view of co-existence, for example in the Ottoman empire Christian and Jewish communities were allowed to exist but with less privileges that the dominant cultural group. In Canada following the seven year's war a more positive situation arose where the french Catholics of New France and the british settlers and Loyalists were able to co-exist, with the establishment of the Quebec Act which guaranteed french cultural (read economic, legal, linguistic and religious) rights. But one must remember that at that time the Quebec act was so offensive to some of the Enlgish that it became part of the Intolerable Acts leading to the revolutionary war.

I think Klein must be clear that she is coming from a Non-Marxist Keynesian socialism which is a tradition in itself. It is not a universal view which hopes for peace in putting communities beside each other in co-existent pluralism but a particular view that may want to establish a happy faced hegemony over various traditions watering them down and making them the same. Sure there maybe Islam, or Christianity, or what have you, but they are really not Islam, Christianity or what have you in the traditional sense but simply historically cultured enclaves that have delayed degeneration as an imminent liberalism conquers all. Is this the End of History? Perhaps Klein is philosophically similair to her neoconservative (classically liberal) enemies in her refusing 'purity', or more outrightly particularity, she sets up a situation where her Keynesian politics 'consumes' other political and religious traditions.

If only she would come clearly out of the closet and like that mother label these other traditions as 'evil', or at least imperialistic.

Which brings me to the most important question for me: is it possible to have a tradition that is not imperialist? Outside of classical liberalism which paradoxically denies tradition yet produces similar 'Empire' can we have a tradition that is anti-imperial intrinsically? I will be honest I appeal the crucified God as the only honest way out of empire.

Part II of this post will deal with the biblical Apocalyptic as inherently anti-imperial, despite the distaste for it Klein displays in her introduction.

Also forgive the untideness of this post, I think I had go ideas but they did not really arrive on screen very well.

re-thinking Christendom

A lot of the intellectual issues I try to deal with our fundamentally about the relationship between the Church, it's theologies and political practice. Recently I have decided to try and work through something that John Milbank poses in an interviewover at the The Other Journal:

"And that means of course, re-think Christendom. But now in more festive, pro-body, yet more interpersonal, less fearing terms and ones celebrating much more excellence and virtue in every realm including those of craft, farming and trade. And having a greater will to the democratization of excellence."

Considering the anti-Christendom strain in my thinking and the traditions I have been apart of (Anabaptist,evangelical,anarchist and missional) this quotation is directly challenging. The political thinking intrinsic to Milbank is that theology has a place in the economic, social and political world beyond the position of prophetic utterance or face-to-face relationship. Examining my thought it seems that the ecclesiology I pertain to puts a monopoly first on the personalist 'face-to-face' and the Anabaptist/liberationist 'prophetic utterance'. For me Milbank has effectively de-stabalized these two monopolies in my mind.

In Missional Church, a book I have mentioned before, Darrell Guder describes the relationship of the church, the people of God, to the reign of God as "the sign,foretaste,instrument and agent of God's rule in Christ" (pg 221). The church is not identical to the reign of God, but is certainly related and the relationship is not easily severed. I will call 'Christendom' a social arrangement which is not identical to the reign of God and neither identical to the Church.

Milbank seems to mention some of the harsher criticisms of the Christendom arrangement including the less festive,anti-body,impersonal,fear-mongering,lack of virtue and lack of respect for the common person as citizen and worker. He is open about the reality that historic Christendom has major flaws but does not abandon the project altogether after the failure of both socialism and liberalism in avoiding both wide-scale genocide,economic injustice and nihilism.

As a member of those various traditions above I would argue about, or more precisely add to, his constructive politics of a re-thought Christendom is a heavy suspicion of power, a rejection of violence, a need to reconcile localism with global technocracy and a recognition of cultural diversities. I would also caution that european imperialism has been an experienced reality of the last five centuries partially out of the failures of the old Christendom.

Re-thinking Chistendom means for me thinking through my cautions and additions to what Milbank is saying. Much of what seems to me to be 'post-Christendom' political theology seems to bubble out of a dialect between an ethical aim (to respond to the other, to have justice) with political suspicion (which comes out of a lived reality of imperialism - such as the Anabaptist persecutions by the state churches in Europe). Yet at the same time in quite clear terms Post-Christendom theology must come to the realization that it is not politically neutral and that even the concept of 'Christendom' is the recognition that our theology will inevitably, if taken to their the logical conclusions, will produce or support some sort of social arrangement which although neither the reign of God nor the Church is something related to the two.

First of all, following Macintyre and also Milbank and 'Theology and Social Theory', we must recover a robust understanding of virtue. But I would caution that this must be 'textured' by the Scriptures and should be more from the Spirit than Aristotle. This means both practice and understanding arising out of the New Testament, especially Paul's epistles. Perhaps love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control" can be the virtues of this new order.

Secondly the suspicion of power and rejection of violence must be taken into account, especially as informed by the New Testament. This means both the development of virtues and communities of nonviolence and a communal respect and distrust of power. There are practical ways of exploring this including favouring the local and de-centralized institutions, including economic and politics ones.

Thirdly - learn from De Certeau and Ellul about technology and it's use. Technology is not a bad thing intrinsically but has the potential, as is shown in actual history, to be very alienating. There are ways to use technology to build community, strengthen the local economy and build towards what Illich call 'conviviality'.

Two things in those whole Christendom discussion:

First - it is secondary or ever tertiary. Not in the sense that it does not matter but in the sense that ethics come before politics. What matters primarily is not the setting up of an order but the spiritual flourishing of individuals and the church in the willingness to suffer and love the last,the lost, the least,the widows, the orphans and the enemies.

Secondly we must head Illich's warning "Responsibility is the soft under-belly of power".

Nein! Barth adding to Milbank

"Nein!" was Karl Barth's boisterous response to the question whether there can be any natural knowledge of God apart from revelation. Here I intend to very briefly show that Barth's "Nein!" can add to Milbank's Ontology of Peace contra an Ontology of violence.

Can an Ontology of Peace be a known, as an alternative to a ontology of violence, by natural reason apart from revelation?

"Nein!"

Well, that is my creative synthesis of two theological projects. To be honest I am not sure whether I agree with my syn-thesis. But I think it would interesting to explore. Especially since an ontology of peace is drawn primarily from scriptural texts that are considered by the Christian tradition as authoritative, and are not be natural reason alone.

Modernity and Christianity

I remember when I read Paul Tillich's "The History of Christian Thought" I was struck immediately by a quotation, one that I can no longer find, where he points to both the establishment of democracies and the advancement of science as a positive result of the Enlightement. He found it strange that how Christians reacted so strongly against these which were generally good.

I find myself agreeing with him on this. Despite being a John Milbank fan and being highly influenced by Theology and Social Theory I disagree with the two-cities dialect inherited from Augustine and interpreted against modernity. I am starting to drift toward the Tillich camp in the belief that we need a different Method of Correlation to account for the relation between Christianity and Modernity. But unlike Tillich, who identified as an existentialist-Christian, I identify more with a narrative Anabaptist position tempered by a missional impulse.

Milbank on the Incarnation

You know I like an author when I make my own category for him..

Anyways I was reading part of his book "Ontology and Pardon" when I came upon this quotation: "In this way a single suffering became also a sovereign suffering, capable of representing all suffering and of forgiving on behalf of all victims."

This is something rather new to me, or at least he presents it in a way that is rather new, for I never considered that the forgiveness that comes from the cross might relate to Christ being a victim of the world. It is weird to talk about Christ this way - our normal language talks about him offering himself which seems very different from being a victim. But perhaps looking at Christ as being a victim - of the cruelty and apathy of the Roman regime, of the second-temple religious establishment, of the violent nationalism of his people and of the cowardice and abandonment of his disciples - can give us a whole new understanding, a whole new way of looking at Sin and Forgiveness.

This new, or at least different, way about looking at Sin is that it a thing, a force, that victimizes. Forgiveness, the alleviation of the guilt and responsibility, can only be offered by a victim. God being supreme could then only offer forgiveness on behalf of the victims if he himself became one. And he did so in the person of Christ on the cross.

I have to say this idea is absolutely stunning. It threw me off. I think the other way of thinking about the Cross, as Christ offering a sacrifice, is still valid. Now though a whole other dimension is added. It really effects our theologies, ways of talking about Christ and the way we do ethics.